Coherence and Consistency
The Lando-Principles and the like are dedicated predominantly to general private law, however. As a result, there is still a lack of understanding with regard to the underlying principles of the mandatory provisions of the European aquis, namely the consumer contract law directives, as well as their interplay with the national private laws in the framework of the basic freedoms of the EC-Treaty. What is needed in terms of a coherent European contract law, is twofold: a list of Principles of European (Consumer) Contract Law regarding the harmonised mandatory substantive law, 12 and a Constitutional Framework for the competition of the member states' private law systems in the remaining fields, i.e. principles of conflict of laws for the internal market. 13 In order to better understand these needs, the fundamental contradiction of European private law has to be recalled. The European directives on the harmonisation of private law 14 follow the "minimum harmonisation approach" established in the Commission's white paper on the completion of the single market in 1985, but do not provide for the "mutual recognition" of private laws in the non-harmonised fields ("home-state principle" or "country of origin approach") inherent to this strategy, which was built on the so-called "Cassis-Philosophy" of the ECJ. 15 Art. 5 of the 1980 Convention on the law applicable to Contractual Obligations 16 (the The fact, that the minimum harmonisation directives are transposed into national private laws in very different ways, here and there providing for a so-called "higher level of protection", led to a situation of complex fragmentation of private laws. In cases, where the directives are not harmonising protection rules, which were already existent in the member states, but introduce new ones, even new restricting impediments on the free movement of goods and services in the internal market have been created. The Distance Selling Directive may serve as an example: 18 Art. 6 foresees a right of the consumer to cancellation of distant selling contracts, which has to be executed within a so-called cooling-off period of "seven working days", but Art. 14 allows for a comparatively higher level of protection in the member states. In transposing the directive into national laws the member states have taken different approaches with regard to the lengths and calculation of such a period: 7 working days (Belgium, England, Spain, Netherlands), 10 days (Italy), 14 days (Norway), and 2 weeks (Germany). 19 In any case the period will not start to run unless the consumer was properly informed on his right of cancellation (Art. 6).
Since Art. 5 of the Rome Convention is predominantly held to be applicable to B2C-E-Commerce transactions 20 Commerce Directive 21 shall not apply to consumer contracts 22 , an E-Shop doing business throughout Europe has to take into account the private laws of 15 (and soon 25) member states, when drafting its terms and conditions. 23 A choice of law clause will prevent the applicability of the law of the consumer's country only, if the law chosen provides a higher level of protection. Here the management has to decide, if a period of e.g. 10 days or 7 working days constitutes a higher level of protection, which is dependant on the applicable holidays and the individual day of delivery of the product. Any mistake in providing the consumer with correct information on the right of cancellation, including the method of calculation of the period, will result in the cooling-off period never starting. The consumer then may execute the right of cancellation within a period of minimum three months (in Germany even unlimited 24 ), while not being obliged to pay for the use of the product in the meantime. Since used items are worthless to a seller, who regularly does not run a second-hand shop, an E-Shop distributing throughout the internal market runs a high risk of loss, due to potential returns. While the big players are able to distribute these costs on a high turn over (self-insurance), the same might not be true for small and middle-sized enterprises ("SME"), because there is no third party insurance available at the market for a reasonable price. 25 Thus, it is still difficult, if not impossible, for businesses to develop distribution strategies that can be applied throughout the internal market. 26 With growing globalisation facilitated by the Euro and catalysed by E-Commerce the consumer-state principle may even turn out to be detrimental to consumers, especially in small member-states, where businesses might refuse to deal. Managers might be reluctant to invest in the adaptation of standardised contract clauses, information policies, and marketing practices for a small number of potential consumers in lets say Luxembourg or Lithuania. To summarize: the minimum harmonisation approach without there being included a mutual recognition clause with regard to the remaining fields does not only appear to be completely useless in terms of overcoming restricting impediments on the free movement of goods. As the example of the minimum harmonised cancellation period illustrates, it might even create new impediments.
The inverse effect on the internal market resulting from this somewhat strange interplay of the harmonisation directives and Art. 5 Rome Convention has led to the question, if the acquis of European consumer contract law is justifiable in the light of the basic freedoms, especially Art. 28 of the EC-Treaty, 27 and, moreover, if the respective directives are covered at all by the competence rule of Art. 95 EC-Treaty. 28 For under Art. 5 and 95 EC-Treaty a limited and specific power is conferred to the Community only, where the harmonisation of the laws of the Member States in fact helps to overcome impediments restricting the free movement of goods and services in the internal market. 29 It is commonly held that the consumer-state principle of Art. 5 Rome Convention, even while constituting a restriction on the free movement of goods, can be justified as a compelling necessity of public policy (i.e. consumer protection) in accordance with the adjudication of the ECJ. 30 However, the ECJ has made clear, that the principle of proportionality has to be applied. 31 Here the assessment of proportionality in the strict sense, i.e. the weighing and balancing of conflicting rights, interests, and policies, cannot be done without taking the paternalistic effects of the consumer state principle into account. The citizens of Europe do not only have a right to a high level of consumer protection 32 , but as well a right to free access to the internal market, indicating that the basic freedoms do not only constitute individual rights for the supply side, but also to the consumers at the demand side of the internal market. 33 In addition, the principle of proportionality leads to the question of the necessity of the impediment, i.e. the question if there are not other possible measures to protect the consumer in cross-border trade, which would have less severe restricting effects on the basic freedoms than the current combination of minimum harmonisation measures and Art. 5 Rome Convention.
Basically there are two potential solutions to the problem. First of all, where the place of business of the party which is to effect the characteristic performance ("the business") is situated in a member state of the EC (or EEA), the home-state principle could be applied to consumer contracts. This rule is already laid down in Art. 4 (2) of the Rome Convention, but it is derogated by Art. 5 for the passive consumer. The principle of mutual recognition could be applied at least, where the consumer protection rules in question are harmonised throughout the EU by directives at a minimum level. 34 This solution formed the centre of a highly controversial discussion in the course of the drafting of the E-commerce Directive (2000/31/EC). Finally it was left to be addressed in the context of the envisaged reform of the Rome Convention. 35 Another solution could be a European Civil Code, which is believed by many to provide a coherent set of rules for cross-border consumer contracts and, thus, to eliminate the necessity to deal with the complex fragmentation of the member states' consumer contract regimes. ernments and stakeholders, including businesses, legal practitioners, academics and consumer organisations. In addition, the Communication sparked a large number of law review articles and legal monographs. 37 On 14 January 2003 the Commission published the "Green Paper on the conversion of the Rome Convention of 1980 on the law applicable to contractual obligations into a Community instrument and its modernisation" (the "Green Paper"). 38 And on 12 February 2003 the Commission published the Communication "A More Coherent European Contract Law. An Action Plan" (the "Action Plan"). 39 The latter is a follow-up document to the Communication of July 2001 and draws conclusions from the responses and makes further suggestions. Both the European contract law project and the modernisation of the Rome Convention project complement each other and will be conducted in parallel. 40 In the following, both communications shall be presented briefly with regard to potential solutions to the described contradictions in the European consumer contract law acquis. In a second step I shall present some suggestions of my own. As a result, the Action Plan, although maintaining the consultative character of the process and indicating the intention to further reflect on a future "optional instrument", suggests a mix of non-regulatory and regulatory measures, which are best described as a combination of options 2 and 3 of the July 2001 communication. In other words, the most important conclusion, the Commission draws from the consultation process, is that "there is no need to abandon the current sector-specific approach" 46 . The project of the drafting of a European Civil Code is, thus, put off the agenda: "In the Commission' s opinion, the 'European contract law project' does neither aim at the uniformisation of contract law nor at the adoption of a European civil law code". 47 The Commission announces a threefold action plan instead, which shall be outlined below.
1) A Common Frame of Reference
The Commission intends to create a common frame of reference (the "Frame"), establishing common principles and terminology in the area of European contract law in the form of a non-binding, publicly accessible document. The Frame should 1) help the Community institutions in ensuring greater coherence of the existing and future acquis, 2) become an instrument in achieving a higher degree of convergence between the contract laws of the EU Member States, and 3) serve as a basis for a possible future optional instrument. The drafting of the Frame will be based on extensive research, which the Commission intends to finance within the context of the Sixth Framework Programme for research and technological development. The Frame is expected to cover general rules on the conclusion, validity and inter- 
2) EU-wide Standard Contract Terms
In order to facilitate single distribution strategies throughout the internal market, the Commission intends to promote the drafting of sector specific standardised contract terms, the application of which is not limited to a specific member state's private law system, but which are designed for EU-wide cross-border transactions.
A special website shall be established as a platform for exchange of information on related private initiatives. Furthermore, the Commission will publish guidelines, indicating points to consider in drafting such terms with respect to mandatory EUcontact law and the competition rules as well as recommending the participation of all stakeholders, including consumer associations, in the drafting process. However, the Commission does not intend to accredit the conformity of specific standardised contract terms with EU-law.
3) Consolidation, Codification, and Recasting of the Acquis
In order to ensure a more coherent European contract law, the Commission intends to improve the quality of the existing acquis with regard to its transparency, simplicity and consistency. Such action would deal with areas already covered by EC legislation, i.e. remedying identified inconsistencies in EC contract law by simplifying and clarifying existing legislation, but would also entail the modernisation of the acquis, i.e. the adaptation of existing legislation to economic, commercial and other developments which were not foreseen at the time of adoption. A further task would be to fill such gaps in EC legislation that have led to particular problems with regard to its application. These measures are identified by the Commission as a priority that needs to be "tackled rapidly". In addition, the Commission will continue to submit new proposals where a sector-specific need for harmonisation arises. 49 , revealed its intention to remove existing inconsistencies, to fill in gaps and to simplify legislation. The use of common definitions (e.g. of consumer contracts) and the harmonisation of cooling-off periods were indeed given high priority. Moreover, the appropriateness of the minimum harmonisation approach was questioned in this area, since it leads to great diversity in national regimes and thus creates obstacles for cross-border business to consumer transactions. The Commission concluded that there is "a need to review and reform existing EU consumer protection directives, to bring them up to date and progressively adapt them from minimum harmonisation to 'full harmonisation' measures … The simple application of mutual recognition, without harmonisation, is not likely to be appropriate for such consumer protection issues. However, provided a sufficient degree of harmonisation is achieved, the country of origin approach could be applied to remaining questions." See the Follow-up of the consultation on a preliminary draft proposal for a Council Regulation on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations ("Rome II") at http://europa.eu.int/comm/justice_home/unit/civil/consultation/contributions_en.htm ; see vate international law the conversion of the Rome Convention into a Community Regulation seems to be a logical consequence in terms of coherence and consistency: the ECJ would have jurisdiction over all Community instruments, so that the problem of uniform interpretation of the Rome Convention and the related concepts of the Brussels I Regulation could be solved.
Modernisation of the Consumer Protection Approach
With regard to the modernisation of the Rome Convention a variety of options are presented, a comprehensive assessment of which would go beyond the scope of this paper. A central point on the reform agenda is the consumer protection issue, however, and it is the one which is most closely related to the Action Plan. Deliberations on a reform of Art. 5 took place already on occasion of the Austrian accession to the Convention in 1996, where the Member States undertook to further consider the issue in the near future. 53 In addition, the Rome Convention was always seen as complementing the 1968 Brussels Convention. In drafting Art. 5 Rome Convention the consumer jurisdiction rule in Art. 13 Brussels Convention, as amended in the light of the ECJ Bertrand decision 54 on occasion of the accession of the UK, Ireland, and Denmark in 1978, was taken as a blueprint. Thus, the protection concept of Art. 5 stems from the late seventies, a time when consumer protection was still in its infancy, and there were no harmonisation measures at the Community level at all. Although the Rome Convention came into force in 1991 only, due to rapid changes in the socio-legal environment the regulatory concept of Art. 5 seems to be quite outdated today.
On the one hand, the ongoing trend towards globalisation, catalysed by the decrease in transaction costs resulting from new information technologies like the Internet, the lift of trade barriers in the context of the EC and the WTO, and the introduction of the Euro, has lead and will continue to lead to an unprecedented increase in consumers' involvement in international cross-border trade, often performed at a distance. Therefore, the Brussels and Rome Conventions' distinction between active and passive consumers is held to be more and more inappropriate, especially in On the other hand, the legal context was altered in a profound way. In the Seventies there was no relevant difference between the Member States' and third states' private laws in terms of the provided level of consumer protection. That is to say, while some Member States like the UK and Denmark as well as third states like the USA or Sweden were very much engaged in consumerism, other Member States as well as a number of other states remained comparatively more reluctant to engage in consumer protection. Consequently, Art. 5 Rome Convention treats all private laws equal: if there is an international contract, every national private law in the world may be chosen, be that French or Chinese law; and irrespective of the parties' choice the passive consumer is always protected by the mandatory rules of the law of the state of her habitual residence. However, within the past decades the EC released an ever increasing amount of directives on the harmonisation of the Member States' contract laws, establishing mandatory protection rules for so-called weaker parties, that are predominantly applicable to consumer-contracts, but to businesses as well. 56 While in the late Eighties there have been only some sector specific "European islands", European measures underwent increasing condensation in the Nineties to what is today commonly referred to as "European contract law" or the "Acquis". In German contract law, for instance, there is today not a single consumer-specific protection rule which is not based on a European measure. 57 As a result, it became impossible for the German legislator to autonomously establish a coherent law of obligations, since any ever so reasonable generalisation on the national level bears the risk of being voided by the ECJ. These changes in the socio-legal context of Art. 5 Rome Convention had essential consequences regarding the relation of the European contract law project and the reform of Art. 5 Rome Convention. Before this issue is elaborated in more detail, the solutions proposed by the Green Paper shall be addressed briefly.
a) Codification of sector-specific rules, limiting the choice of the law of third states
As has been pointed out, the Rome Convention follows a national and at the same time universal approach, but does not take into account the supranational dimension of the European contract law acquis, which was not yet existent in the late seventies. Thus, a cross-border contract between parties domiciled in different countries within the internal market is regarded as international, and the parties may choose a third country law. The German courts had to decide on cases, for instance, where German tourists during their stay in Spain were sold time-share rights under the laws of the Isle of Man. 59 In order to guarantee the mandatory community law standards in cases with a close connection to a Member State of the EU, many directives contain specific rules limiting the effect of the parties choice of a third states' law. 60 However, the proliferation of such special rules outside the Rome convention is a source of serious concern. 61 It was therefore suggested to codify these special rules by means of an extension of Art. 3 (3) of the Rome Convention, thereby treating the Community as a single state. 62 In its Green Paper, the Commission eventually sketched the following solution which draws in fact on a suggestion by the European Group for Private International Law (GEDIP) 63 : "The fact that the parties have chosen the law of a non- Therefore, the specific conflict rules contained in the consumer contract law directives, which in Germany were recently consolidated in Art. 29 a EGBGB, 65 guarantee their application not only in pure internal market cases, but in all cases where the contract has a close connection to the territory of the Member States. However, the meaning of that term in relation to Art. 4 ( 1 ) (closest connection), or Art. 5 (2) and 7 ( 1 ) Rome Convention is quite unclear. 66 Moreover, in its Ingmar decision the ECJ despite a choice of the law of the US-based principal applied the mandatory protection rules of the commercial agents directive (86/653/EEC), which contains no specific conflict rule, solely on the ground of the agent pursuing his activities in a Member State. 67 While the former extensions may be covered by a reformed Art. 5, the latter issue could only be addressed within the context of Art. 7. 68
b) Ratio of Art. 5 Rome Convention
International contract law, embracing the principles of party autonomy (Art. 3) and closest connection (Art. 4), is based on the comitas doctrine, under which national courts do not necessarily have to apply domestic law, but foreign private laws as well. The underlying idea is that all national contract laws are more or less equivalent in providing for ius commutativa, i.e. a just balance of interests between the parties, but at the same time are marked by the absence of public policies (i.e. pure private law). 69 As a result there is no public interest in the application of the domestic private law. However, with the rise of consumerism in private law this general presumption of equivalence is questioned. Although the move from formal to substantive concepts of justice is a general trend at least in the OECD countries, the consumer protection approaches of the different private law systems vary substantially, where some national legislators are dedicated to a quite aggressive consumerism, while others must be seen as having been much more reluctant. It follows, that states with a relatively high level of consumer protection develop a public interest in the application of their mandatory protection regime even in international situations.
It is obvious, however, that the business man ordering a meal in Hong Kong or the tourist buying sunglasses in Miami cannot rely on the mandatory laws of the state of their habitual residence, only because he or she believes this legal regime to be more favourable to the issue. In making a distinction between the active and the passive consumer Art. 5 follows the public international law approach of territoriality. Where a business came to the consumer and, thus, entered the domestic market by means of marketing, i.e. sending in an agent, making specific invitations, or simply by advertising, or by inducing the consumer to travel abroad in order to conclude a contract, the domestic protection regime applies. While according to Art. 3(3) and Art 4(2) a contract is purely domestic only, where the contract is concluded through a place of business in the country of the habitual residence of the other party, Art. 5(2) extends the scope of the domestic mandatory rules to all kinds of indirect (agent, broker, or other intermediary) and distant (mail, telephone, internet) marketing techniques, addressing the consumer in its home-country. Problems do not only arise in the context of financial services where e.g. the provision of individual investment advice or management clearly constitutes a service within the meaning of Art. 5( 1 ), whereas the same service could be easily transformed into a financial "product" (say, a structured bond or a share in a special purpose vehicle or investment fund), the transfer of which would not be covered. Just as unclear is the status of contracts on the pure lease of movable goods (i.e. without an option on the future transfer of property) and, furthermore, the licensing of the use of intellectual property like software, information, music, videos and other content, which is about to become very common in the context of ECommerce, where even so-called E-Books are no longer sold in terms of a transfer of property. 75 It is suggested, therefore, to extend the definition of consumer contracts. The GEDIP proposes Art. There are two qualifications, however, which have to be made with regard to the concept of the consumer contract: (a) Consumer protection in contract law is legitimised by the fact of an imbalance between the parties, i.e. the consumer being the weaker party as compared to a party acting within its trade or profession. The consumer protection directives, therefore, do apply only to contracts between a business and a consumer. This is as well the position taken in Art. 15 ( 1 ) c Brussels I Regulation. In terms of a coherent European contract law, a single concept of the consumer contract should be used, being defined by a common frame of reference, unless good reasons to do otherwise are provided. It follows, that Art. 5( 1 ) should apply to business-to-consumer transactions only, as suggested as well by the GEDIP.
Furthermore, there is another qualification inherent to consumer protection: (b) A consumer is per definition acting on the demand side of a market. 78 For a person offering goods or services -even when acting outside its trade or profession -is not consuming, but acts in the role of a supplier and, in case of the supply of services, as an employee (Art. 6 Rome Convention). Art. 5( 1 ) Rome Convention, therefore, defines a consumer contract as "… a contract the object of which is the supply of goods or service to a person ('the consumer') …". This is made clear as well in the proposition of the GEDIP 79 and also in the Community directives on consumer protection, which cover business-to-consumer transactions, but not vice versa. follows, that in a consumer contract as a general rule the consumer is supplied with something (usually defined as a good or service) by a business in exchange for a consideration (including, but not limited to money). 81 However, this fact is not made clear by Art. 15( 1 ) c of the Brussels I Regulation as quoted above in paragraph [31] . On the other hand, the current use of the term "supply with goods or services" and even the proposed term "supply with property or services" (GEDIP) has turned out to be too narrow to cover all mandatory consumer contract provisions. As a possible solution to this problem, the concept of the "characteristic performance", which is already well established in Art. 4(2) could be used in a future definition of "the consumer contract" in Art. 5( 1 ) Rome Convention, but as well in the "Common Frame of Reference". A respective proposition of such a definition is provided later in this paper (see section E.).
bb) The revision of the concept of the "passive" consumer in Art. 5(2)
As indicated above, the concept of the passive consumer is held to be insufficient today for a variety of reasons. The Green Paper here presents a set of solutions, which is very difficult to understand and, thus, to comment on, since the different reasons for an amendment of Art. 5(2) are not clearly separated. There are three distinct problems, which have to be addressed by a reform: 1) On the one hand, the active consumer should be guaranteed the mandatory protection of the EC-acquis in cases closely connected to the internal market. 2) On the other hand, the protection of the passive consumer by the mandatory rules of the country of her habitual residence is questionable, where the law otherwise applicable is the law of another Member state of the EC or EEA, and both laws are with regard to the protection rules at issue minimum harmonised by EC-Directives. 3) Finally, the current distinction between the active and passive consumer is not clear cut in the context of cross-border B2C-E-Commerce. A solution here should enhance consumer trust by providing a sufficient degree of protection, while at the same time enabling EU-
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The consideration offered by the consumer must -of course -not be a adequate. However, there is no need for contractual consumer protection in case of a gratuitous promise of a business. The scope of this concept is best described by the term "entgeltliche Leistung" (something like: performance in exchange for a (i.e. any) consideration) used in section 312(1) German Civil Code (the "BGB") with regard to door-step selling. The problem of a contract without consideration was addressed as well in ECJ Case C-45/96 -Dietzinger, ECR 1998, I-1199, where the ECJ ruled that the Door-Step-Selling Directive 85/577/EEC is applicable to a guarantee, although the guarantor receives no consideration himself, since the guarantee is connected to the credit agreement and the creditor provides a service (credit) to a third party (the debtor). However, according to the ECJ the credit agreement itself must be a consumer credit in order for the Directive being applicable to the guarantee. See as well BGH, NJW 1998, 2356.
wide distribution strategies in order to ensure, that the right of consumers to access the European markets is not limited by the reluctance of SMEs to deal with consumers under 25 different protection regimes. 82 All three problems have in common, that the fact of the emergence of a new, supranational level of contract law, which was not yet existent when the Rome Convention was drafted, has to be reflected. In the context of the European contract law acquis, the concept of the application of the law of the country of the consumers habitual residence seems to be somewhat outdated. It was often said, that the consumer "trusts" in the application of the protection rules of his home state, but it was certainly never true that the consumer would know that law. Otherwise, the quite excessive obligations on the seller, supplier etc. to provide information with regard to applying consumer protection measures, especially as regards cancellation rights, would have been superfluous. It is true, however, that the consumer may have developed some kind of generalised expectation of being treated fairly by the law and the courts of her home-state. It follows, that consumers, while having no specific interest in the application of their home-state law, in fact do have a more general interest in being afforded a sufficient level of protection. Thus, if being informed in advance that there is a right to cancellation within a certain period according to, lets say, English law, the application of such law is absolutely fine with the consumer, even if the period under his home-state law would be three days longer. However, this is somewhat more complicated for the already mentioned "travelling" or "active" consumer: it may come to her as a bad surprise when a contract made while travelling somewhere through Europe were to be subjected by the terms of the contract to the law of a third state, if this state's law either did not provide for any protection or for a lower level of protection as e.g. in the Isle-ofMan cases mentioned above. This is especially irritating when and where such choice of law clauses are effectively "hidden" in the general terms and conditions of the contract. Finally, the consumer has potentially no interest in the mandatory application of his home-state law, if this would result in a refusal to deal with the consumer by businesses which are not prepared to adopt a specific legal distribution policy under the law of the state of the consumer and, therefore, prefer not to enter into contracts with consumers from certain states. This is especially true if the business would be prepared to deal with the consumer under another law which in turn provides for a sufficient degree of consumer protection. To sum up it can be said that the consumer has a legitimate interest in not being deprived of the high level of protection afforded to him by the European consumer protection acquis, i.e.
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All three problems are implicitly adressed by the solutions proposed by the Grenn Paper at 3.2.7.3
there is a legitimate interest in the application of the law of a Member State, which is not necessarily the state of the habitual residence of the consumer. 83 In addition, a full scale analysis of the proposals with regard to a reform of Art. 5 Rome Convention has to reflect on the legitimate interests of the involved businesses. Here two things seem to be essential. On the one hand, as for the consumer, there may be some interest in the application of the law of the home-state of the business. But that is not of overall importance. Under Art. 4(2) sentence 2 Rome Convention the home-state of a business is the country where the place of business which under the contract is obliged to effect the characteristic performance is situated. It follows, that a business with its principal place of business in England, which maintains additional places of business abroad, has more than one home state and, thus, under the home-state principal is -except for a choice of law, which under the current regime of Art. 5 Rome Convention is limited in effect -not able to follow a uniform distribution strategy under a single legal regime. In terms of transaction costs of cross-border trade, however, the latter would be the most favourable solution to the business. As a result it can be said, that businesses have predominantly a legitimate interest in the application of a single legal regime, but not necessarily the one of the home-state in terms of the principal place of business. On the other hand, certainty with regard to the applicable law is of great importance. For a business will be able to make an informed decision about where and with whom to deal, to set up prices according to involved legal risks, and to conform with potential information obligations only if the legal regime applicable to a transaction is definite from the outset. With regard to consumer contracts the business should thus be able to know in advance whether or not a transaction constitutes a consumer contract, where the habitual residence of the consumer is located, and whether or not the law of the consumer-state will be applicable.
Under the regime of the current Art. 
D. The Future of European Contract Law: Three Scenarios
Since for the time being, there is no European contract law regime, which would qualify as a legal system autonomously governing cross-border consumer transactions, the question addressed by the Action Plan and the Green Paper is, which strategy the Community should follow in order to reach a solution. And indeed, in this perspective both projects are closely interrelated, since the reform of the Rome Convention cannot be addressed without knowing, where the European contract law project is heading for. The following section shall give a brief presentation of three different scenarios of future development which are implied in the Action Plan and Green Paper.
The best of all worlds: an optional instrument
The best solution would be an optional European Contract Code, covering not only contract law but as well the related questions of transfer of and securities in property and the law of unjust enrichment. Such a European Contract Code could be implemented as a Community Regulation, which would apply to all international contracts, but like the CISG the Code would allow for an opt-out in international situations, and in addition for an opt-in in purely national situations by means of choice of law. Such a Code would, of course, provide for a high level of consumer protection, thereby rendering unnecessary a decision on the difficult questions of applicable law under the international contract law regime of the Rome Convention. However, this would only be true for cross-border contracts in pure internal market cases. The Rome Convention, especially Art. 5, would still have to provide rules on the law applicable in international situations with a connection to a third, non-EU state, on the one hand, and on the applicable law in case of the parties opting-out of the Code, on the other. In the latter case, e.g. if an English company sells to a German consumer under a choice of English law, the current Regime of Art. 5, probably as amended to reflect the changes in Art. 15 of the Brussels I Regulation, would apply. A clear-cut distinction between a European Civil Code and national private laws would not only allow for coherence and consistency on both levels, but as well for a workable competition of private laws. Once a European regulation would come into force, there is no longer any legitimation for the European harmonisation directives, because all cases relevant to the functioning of the internal market were covered by the regulation. Thus, the national private law legislators would be able again, to follow an autonomous strategy in the development of their private laws without the constant risk of being voided by the ECJ. The current minimum harmonisation approach, on the opposite, led to a situation well known as a fallacy of federalism: the distribution of competencies between different political levels, where neither the European Community nor the Member States are able to follow a coherent concept in private law legislation, constitutes a situation often described as "organised irresponsibility". 89 As indicated above, the current interplay of the harmonisation directives with Art. 5 Rome Convention could be justified in the light of the basic freedoms only if the resulting impediments to the free movement of goods and services in the internal market were proportionate with regard to the aim of these measures. Art. 95 ECTreaty constitutes a Community competency only where harmonisation is necessary for the completion of the internal market. Since the passive consumer under Art. 5 Rome Convention is protected by the mandatory rules of her home-state, the harmonisation directives currently can be legitimised only with regard to the active consumer in the internal market. However, the harmonisation measures have to be transposed into the Member States' general private law, thus prescribing a certain level of consumer protection both in purely national cases and in those cases obviously involving the "passive" consumer. But the "active" consumer, as addressed by the Community directives, somehow remains a "chimera": 90 that is to say that approximately 99 per cent of all consumer contracts are purely national or concluded by passive consumers. 91 The Community can, thus, be regarded as being 3% ) as a part of total sales due to existing barriers. Companies prefer to work together with or acquire a local firm in order to profit from their knowledge of the local market, consumer attitude and interpretation of local legislation ("think international, act local")."
involved in an activity of trying to shoot birds with canons). In other words, the question of proportionality arises where, for example, the Consumer Sales Directive results in a full scale reform of German sales contract law, only because this law is applicable in less than one per cent of the transactions covered 92 as well to some tourists or other active consumers from the EU. On the background of the described extent of Art. 5 Rome Convention these considerations are nothing other than a set of meaningless common places combined with purposefully construed misdirections in order to fabric a competence for har-92 It has to be taken into account, that a transformation of the Consumer Sales Directive (1999/44/EC) limited to consumer contracts would have led to an unbearable fragmentation of the German civil law codification "BGB". Therefore, the German legislator decided to reform the general sales contract provisions in the BGB, which apply as well to consumer-to-consumer and business-to-business transactions. Thus the active consumer contracts, the regulation of which the Directive is heading for (see considerations 2-5 of the Directive), account for far less then one per cent of all covered transactions. monisation under Art. 95 EC-Treaty where in fact there is none. In almost every described cross-border consumer transaction, especially those involving crossborder E-Commerce, the mandatory laws of the country of the consumers habitual residence do apply under Art. 5 Rome Convention. It follows, that consumer trust in cross-border transactions cannot be enhanced by a harmonisation of mandatory consumer protection rules of the private laws of other Member States, which will not be applicable anyway (except, of course, for the rare case of an active consumer). 94 There are two solutions to this fundamental problem. Either the European Community limits the unproportionally broad side-effects of its measures on the Member States' private laws in order to target only the problems specific to the internal market (i.e. currently only the active consumer). Or the Community broadens the legitimate scope of its harmonisation measures by providing for mutual recognition of the Member States' private laws at least in the harmonised fields. That is to say, if the extent to which the consumer-state principle under Art.
of the Rome Convention applies is limited, the legitimation of harmonisation measures under Art. 9EC-Treaty is broadened respectively, and vice versa.
A third solution would be to transfer the general competence for (at least the economically relevant) private law legislation from the Member States to the Community level. However, that solution would make necessary an amendment of the EC-Treaty and, moreover, may not be in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity.
A European optional instrument would, however, combine the first and second solution. As opposed to the harmonisation directives it would in no way interfere with the Member States competencies in private law legislation, except for providing an alternative contract law regime, which the parties of cross-border contracts may choose (by means of not opting out) in order to circumvent the impediments to the basic freedoms resulting from the complex fragmentation of Member States' private laws, especially with a view to mandatory consumer protection rules. At the same time the consumer-state principle of Art. 5 Rome Convention would not be applicable, where a contract is governed by the European code. Thus, the legitimate effect of a European optional code would be broader than that of harmonisation measures (i.e. including all cross-border consumer contracts, irrespective of the consumer being active or passive) and at the same time much more target specific with regard to side-effects (i.e. excluding purely national situations, unless parties opt-in, which would strengthen party autonomy and be a necessity under the principle of equality in order to prevent the phenomenon of domestic trade discrimination). Another advantage of an optional code is, that it would allow for a competition between different private law regimes. This would -of course -not be a complete competition between the law of the Member States and the optional code on a level playing field. With regard to consumer contracts under national private law, the current or reformed regime of Art. 5 Rome convention would continue to apply. However, it would be left to the business to decide, if it prefers to deal under the current regime of national private law in combination with the mandatory rules of the country of the consumer's habitual residence, or under the uniform regime of the European optional code.
As a result it can be said, that the Commission should focus all available capacities on the drafting of an European optional code while wasting no more time with further harmonisation measures, which at the point when the optional instrument enters into force should be abandoned . This would ensure the Member States' full responsibility and sovereignty in the area of purely internal private law legislation in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity.
The worst case scenario: proliferation of harmonisation without mutual recognition
The argumentation followed in this paper is not new. Similar concerns have repetitively been raised by learned private law scholars, and -in addition -were already compiled and consolidated by many contributions responding to the July 2001 Communication on European Contract Law. But, in light of the compelling force of the arguments made in favour of an optional code, the conclusions drawn by the Commission from the consultation process are somewhat surprising. Of course, the Commission is right in putting a European Civil Code of the agenda, where that term would indicate a uniform law replacing national private laws. But, although the Commission is intending to continue reflections on an optional instrument, the combination of such reflections with further harmonisation and, moreover, the literal "harmonisation of harmonisation" measures must be seen as utterly misguided. This is not only true in terms of priorities, where the focus on further harmonisation is as a matter of capacities certainly delaying the drafting of an optional code. The concern with this combined approach is more fundamental.
According to the principle of the rule of law, laws should not only be coherent and consistent, but also relatively stable, i.e. "they should not be changed to often". 95 [Vol. 04 No. 04 This is true also from an economic perspective, since every change in private law legislation leads to tremendous costs, especially in the private sector, where marketing strategies, general business terms and conditions, and compliance procedures have to be adapted. The sector specific approach of the European harmonisation measures during the Nineties did lead to a troubling proliferation of directives which transformed the character of national private law legislation, once dedicated to the idea of codification, into a continuous work in progress. This problem was stressed e.g. by the joint response of the Lando-Commission an the Study Group: "The quality of private law in the EU can only be significantly improved if the present sector-specific approach … is overcome." 96 Thus one can rightly wonder, what inspired the Commission in its Action Plan to the statement that "none of the contributions indicated that the sectoral approach as such leads to problems or that it should be abandoned." 97 It follows, that the intention of the Commission to improve the quality and modernise the existing acquis, and to continue to put forward new sector-specific proposals (see supra para. 16-17) should be subjected to a thorough cost-benefit analysis. The relatively little advantages of a consolidation of the acquis in order to tackle smallscale sector-specific inconsistencies by means of new minimum harmonisation directives, which for their inherent necessity of discretionary transposition by national legislators would not ensure overall consistency anyways, have to be weighed against the disadvantages resulting from the need for continuing large-scale changes and adaptations in the Member States' private laws and the related private sector costs. Coherence in European contract law cannot be achieved by an approach heading for "more of the same". Harmonising the patchwork acquis by means of harmonisation directives amounts to a strategy of replacing one evil with another. 98 The Action Plan indicates that the Commission understands the improvement and modernisation of the acquis as part of an overall strategy that is embedded in the drafting of the Common Frame of Reference and intended to lead in the long run to a coherent European contract law, codified in a potential optional instrument. However, the continued release of harmonisation directives, especially if combined with a switch from minimum to full harmonisation (see supra para. 17), will lead to an increasing uniformisation of the national private law systems without any limita- tion to cross-border transactions. This approach would, therefore, only be consistent within an overall strategy, which is heading for a uniform European Civil Code replacing the national laws. But this is not the intention of the Commission (see supra para. 13). The Action Plan is promoting an optional instrument as long-term solution instead. Since an optional code for internal market cross-border transactions -as has been shown above -is not relying on the harmonisation of the Member States' private laws, there is an inconsistency between the short-and long-term measures proposed by the Action Plan.
Finally, in its Green Paper the Commission suggests that the scope of Art. 5 Rome Convention is likely to be extended in order to cover all kinds of contracts. This is apparently done to clarify that consumers in cross-border B2C-E-Commerce transactions are protected as "passive" consumers and also to protect the active consumer who is deliberately shopping throughout the internal market. The Action Plan, however, leaves the question of mutual recognition in harmonised areas unaddressed, and the Green Paper is very vague in this respect. 99 Both Communications together, therefore, raise the fundamental concern, that in a worst case scenario a continually condensed private law harmonisation could be combined with an extension of the country-of-destination approach in Art. 5 Rome Convention. The Commission's reluctance to acknowledge and address the intrinsic interrelation between the consumer directives and the corresponding conflict rules may thus lead to a situation where the Commission deprives itself, by means of the enactment of a Rome I Regulation, of the -already very thin -legitimation basis for further harmonisation measures under Art. 95 EC-Treaty.
A Constitutional Framework for the Competition of Private Laws
If the best solution to the problems of European contract law, i.e. an optional code, is obviously far from being available in the near future, the question arises if there is a second-best solution which is, however, not necessarily the one literally most similar to the best solution (the so-called second-best problem). The alternative to a uniform consumer contract law established by an European optional instrument is, in fact, to follow the country-of-origin approach, i.e. the policy of minimum harmonisation in combination with mutual recognition, which is inherent to the ECJ adjudication on the basic freedoms and which was successfully adopted by the Commission in its 1985 strategy for the completion of the internal market. This solution allows businesses to establish uniform marketing and distribution schemes throughout the internal market on the basis of the home-state principle, i.e. by EU-wide application of the law of the country where its principal place of business is situated. From the point of view of the business, the economies of scale realised by legal standardisation effects are equal to the effects of a uniform optional instrument. However, the consumer would then have to deal under 25 different private laws. That might not be of much concern, since even the consumer under the consumer-state principle is currently not able to realise standardisation effects, because he usually is not a repeat player effectively employing general terms and conditions. In addition, the consumer can regularly not be expected to "know the law", including her home-state law. He is protected by harmonisation measures guaranteeing a high level of consumer protection under all Member States' private laws, and moreover by information obligations with regard to consumer rights afforded to him by the applicable law.
There are, however, some serious disadvantages resulting from this second best solution. Among others these are the broad side-effects of harmonisation measures with regard to purely national cases; for one, there is the high risk of inconsistencies inherent to the concept of the Directive that has to be transposed by national legislators and that makes it so difficult for the ECJ to guarantee a uniform application throughout the EU; furthermore, there is the inconsistency of the harmonisation approach with the long-term aim of an optional instrument; and last but not least there is the resulting difference between consumer-state jurisdiction (Art. 15 ff. Brussels I Regulation) and the application of business' home-state law, where real judges are neither educated nor willing to apply foreign private law, 100 and the courts are not equipped for that task as a matter of day-to-day business -in stark contrast to what we are made to believe when reading the average "conflicts of law" text book. That is to say, here again there is a need for a thorough cost-benefit analysis, where the advantages of the often praised competition of systems or jurisdictions -if workable in the area of contract law at all 101 -have to be weighed against the enormous legal transaction costs and the decrease in certainty resulting from the idea of an EU-wide ubiquitous and simultaneous application of 25 different private laws. Judges regularly are fully occupied with a diligent application of 100
In the Isle-of-Man Case decided by the FCJ (BGHZ 135, , 124), for instance, the lower Courts had not even tried to solve the case under the laws of the Isle-of-Man. The whole argument was just about the applicability of the German protection rules. Thus, the FCJ in its decission simply presumed, that the contract would be enforceable under the law of the Isle-of-Man (at II 2 and 3).
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For a very good analysis and a sceptical result with regard to the prerequisites of a competition in both mandatory as well as dispositive private law see Kieninger, WETTBEWERB DER PRIVATRECHTSORDNUNGEN IM EUROPÄISCHEN BINNENMARKT, 2002 their own country's law already. To transform the application of foreign private law from an exception into a regular case would end up in making legal dilettantism a principle and fundament of the European judicial area.
However, as long as the Commission holds on to its sector-specific harmonisation approach and continues in its intention to tackle the described fallacies of that approach by a "more of the same"-strategy, one should make the best out of it, and that is to provide for a constitutional framework, i.e. principles of conflicts of law which help constitute an "European system of private laws". 102 As has convincingly been argued by Stefan Grundmann in such a system there are three kinds of norms to be differentiated on the substantive contract law plane: substantive mandatory law prescribing a certain content of contracts; information obligations which, although mandatory do not prescribe a certain content and, while tackling the problem of information asymmetries, are rather facilitative in nature; and, finally, the so-called dispositive law which, although it might receive a quasi-mandatory status within the context of judicial control over standardised contract forms, is generally providing for a standard content of contracts only where the parties did not agree otherwise.
Grundmann suggests that in a European system of contract laws there should be full harmonisation on the European level with regard to information obligations, which make up the core of the European contract law acquis today, 103 since these rules on the one hand do not substantially interfere with party autonomy, while, on the other, it is, in fact, very difficult for businesses to comply with a fragmented system of only minimum harmonised information obligations. This argument is supported by the above discussed example of the divergences in the length and calculation of cooling-off periods and respective information obligations. The intention of the Commission to bring consistency to this area of consumer protection by means of full harmonisation measures is, thus, completely in line with this argumentation.
Mandatory content rules, however, do substantially interfere with party autonomy. At the end of the day, a uniform European solution would bear the risk of inflexibility and cementation of "single just solutions", which might turn out as economically inefficient or even detrimental to consumers. 104 Such rules should, therefore, only be minimum harmonised on the European level, while the Member States' could provide different solutions of higher protection. However, with regard to these Member State rules the home-state principle should apply in order to ensure competition as a discovery process with regard to the most efficient solution, but only within the framework of European minimum harmonisation.
Finally, with regard to the dispositives contract rules there should be full competition. In contrast, Grundmann suggests that the Commission might offer an additional dispositive framework for party autonomy by means of an optional instrument. This limited competition is of course already provided for by means of choice of law under Art. 3 Rome Convention which is not limited under Art 5 of the Convention with regard to non-mandatory law.
E: A Common Frame of Reference: Some Propositions
When taking into account the intentions of the Commission expressed in the Action Plan and its Green Paper, the third scenario is obviously the one most likely to be realised in a short and middle-term perspective. Therefore, in the following some propositions shall be made with regard to a definition of the consumer contract as part of a future Common Frame of Reference as well as to a possible reform of Art. 5 Rome Convention, the formulation of which seems to be essential in preventing the described worst case scenario. Once again, however, it should be stressed that there are fundamental concerns with regard to the third scenario, being a "second best solution" only.
The Multiple Directive Launching System: a Call for a Moratorium
Preferably the Commission should stop its multiple directive launching system by means of a five-years moratorium on further harmonisation measures in the area of contract law. This time period should be used to focus all intellectual capacities on the drafting of a European optional code, which could build on the results of the extensive research made available during the last decade. Since the drafting of rules and principles of general European contract law has advanced considerably, one of the major remaining tasks is the integration of the mandatory European consumer contract law into this framework. With regard to the first part of the first sentence of the definition it has been shown above that all kinds of contracts between a business and a consumer should be covered, where the business effects the characteristic performance in exchange for any consideration by the consumer (see supra at para. 29-34). The problems related with the concept of the supply of goods and services, or the supply of property, which are often construed by the judiciary in a too narrow way, could be overcome by this extension, drawing on the concept of the characteristic performance established in Art. 4(2) Rome Convention.
With regard to the second part of the first sentence, i.e. the definition of the consumer, it is made clear that the intention of the consumer to conclude the contract "for private, family, or household use" (see Art. 2 a CISG), or to put it the other way around, "for a purpose which can be regarded as being outside his trade or profession" (Art. 5 ( 1 ) Rome Convention and the similar definition in the quoted Consumer Directives) should be obvious to the business in advance as expressed e.g. by Art. 2 a) CISG: "unless the seller, at any time before or at the conclusion of the contract, neither knew nor ought to have known that the goods were bought for any such use." 105 This qualification is essential to businesses, because otherwise they would not be able to either exclude consumers from their marketing scheme or to calculate prices and to draft terms and conditions in accordance with the consumer protection rules, andmost importantly -to comply with any applicable information obligation (see supra para. 37-38). Art. 5 Rome Convention is already interpreted in the light of the solution of Art. 2 a) CISG by the majority of legal scholars. 106 However, this interpretation is contested and not yet supported by any precedence. It should, therefore, be integrated into the definition.
Thus, the second part of the first sentence makes it clear, that the intention of the consumer, which as an internal fact generally remains private, shall be recognisable to the business on the basis of the external circumstances or the representations given by the consumer. Such definition is inherent as well to many national consumer protection laws, e.g. to the British Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977, which defines the consumer as "a person who neither makes the contract in the course of the business nor holds himself out as doing so". 107 The business is generally held not to be obliged to ask its customers if they act as consumers or in the course of their trade or business. However, if the customer is asked for the purpose of the contract and makes a wrong representation, then she should be treated accordingly. This is especially important in E-Commerce transactions, where there are usually no external circumstances which would allow the business to decide whether or not it deals with a consumer. 108 An example could be the purchase of a computer from the distant seller Dell, where the customer entering the internet distribution portal is offered a separate "private" and "business" distribution channel. In the latter channel the customer may choose between a "1Year Collect and Return Service" up to a "5 Year On-Site Next Business Day Service Support". 109 Here a consumer holding himself out as being a professional and, thus, profiting from a substantially lower price, should later-on not be able to rely on the minimum guarantee period of two years provided for in Art. 5( 1 ) of the Consumer Sales Directive.
However, where no such expressed representation is requested from a customer, one will have to rely on the external circumstances as they were recognisable to the business. One of the most important external circumstances is the distribution 
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An exception may be a characteristic performance, which usually can be used for private use only, or a contract, where the volume or value usually is only demanded by businesses: see Ferrari, in: Schlechtriem (ed.), CISG-KOMMENTAR, 3rd ed. 2000, Art 2 N. 17 f.; However, the majority of all products and services can be used for private and/or professional use. Thus, there should be a clear distinction in advance, based on the external circumstances or the representations of the parties.
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See www.dell.co.uk channel used by the business. Sentence two of the definition, therefore, states that a contract concluded under a sales, service-provision, or other marketing scheme directed predominantly towards consumers is deemed to be a consumer contract. This presumption is intended first of all to make things very clear and easy in case of all distribution channels directed to consumers, e.g. super-markets, departmentstores, and other retailers involved in the distribution of consumer products, but also in case of the provision of services. The general rule would be that a business offering products to the general public without differentiating between private and business customers will in any case do so subject to consumer contract law.
An intended side-effect of such presumption will be, however, that small businesses purchasing from consumer distribution channels will be protected as well. Thus, an entrepreneur buying coffee and milk for its employees in a super-market, or any other product like a telephone, computer or even a car in a consumer distribution channel without being asked for or otherwise expressing its intention of business (or at least dual) use would eventually be treated as a consumer. This effect, however, is legitimate in view of the basic equality rule of justice, i.e. treating like cases alike. There is simply no reason to treat a business differently that paid the same price and received the same product and service as a consumer, while the other party (the business, effecting the characteristic performance) obviously did not care about the private or business status of its customers.
The proposed definition of consumer contracts is thus not only providing for legal certainty and predictability, but as well for a kind of opt-in and opt-out model which is a solution to a fundamental problem with the concept of contractual consumer protection. The traditional consumer protection measures are often criticised for not being purposeful and specific enough in targeting the situations where protection is really needed. On the one hand, this critique is aiming at the over-protection due to the involved paternalism towards the consumer, restricting its private autonomy without any exception by not allowing a private person to opt-out of the protection regime even where that would be an informed choice and/or in the objective interest of the consumer in an individual situation. On the other hand, consumer protection is often criticised for the inherent under-protection with regard to SMEs, which are held to be in need of protection as much as consumers, specifically where information asymmetries are addressed. 110 110 See the detailed analysis at Calliess, Nach der Schuldrechtsreform: Perspektiven des Verbrauchervertragsrechts, ARCHIV FÜR DIE CIVILISTISCHE PRAXIS (ACP) 203 (2003), forthcoming.
unfair to the consumer. The protection is deemed to be equivalent, if the respective mandatory rules are minimum harmonised by EC-Directives transposed into both laws.]
Para. 1 contains the definition of the consumer contract as explained above. Para. 2 deals with the applicable law in the absence of a choice and draws on the solution proposed by the GEDIP. The application of the law of the country where the consumer has its habitual residence is extended in order to cover E-Commerce transactions. However, it is made clear that a consumer misleading the business about its country of habitual residence is protected by the laws of the state, where the business expected this place to be in good faith. The exceptions b) and c) are taken from the proposal of GEDIP, however, exception a) is included in order to deal with online delivery of non-tangible goods or services in accordance with the UCITA solution. 111
Para. 3 sentence 1 limits the choice of law to the laws of the Member States in order to ensure that the minimum protection of the European consumer directives be guaranteed in all cases where European courts have jurisdiction. Sentence 2 makes clear, that a third-state business may choose the application of the law of the member state, where it maintains a branch, or at least an agency or other establishment. The last two terms broaden the home-state principle in accordance with Art. 15 (2) Brussels I Regulation, which subjects businesses without a domicile, but with a branch (i.e. a place of business in terms of Art. 4 (2) Rome Convention), agency or other establishment in the EU to European jurisdiction. Sentence 3 introduces an obligation to inform the consumer on the fact of the choice of law (but not on the content of the law chosen) before concluding the contract, in order to prevent choice of law clauses to be hidden somewhere in the general business terms and conditions where they are never read.
The proposed solution would completely abolish the situation of dépeçage since it results in unnecessary complexity of adjudication and, due to the cumulative application of two different consumer protection regimes, in an unfair over-protection of the consumer. A choice of law clause would thus come to effect only, where the laws of the consumer state do not apply (see supra para. 37-38). However, if in the course of the reform project a different approach should be taken, which would allow for dépeçage and thus would make a comparison between two different consumer protection regimes necessary, then it is essential to ensure that the fact of the minimum harmonisation of the Member State's contract laws with regard to con-111 See supra para. 38 with note 85
